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Abstract
Habitual residence has now become an internationally accepted 
connecting factor in conflict of laws and is widely being used as an alternative to, 
or replacement of, domicile.  This concept, however, remains remote to American 
conflict of laws.  Although the use of habitual residence in the U.S. courts is 
mandated by the codification of the Hague Child Abduction Convention, there is 
still a lack of general acceptance in American conflict of law literature.  The Article 
argues that habitual residence should be adopted as a conflict of law connecting 
factor in American conflict of laws, and it would be unwise for the U.S. to stay 
isolated from the rest of the world.  The ongoing drafting of the Restatement 
(Third) of Conflict of Laws provides a great opportunity to reposition American 
Conflict of Laws so that the international issues would be properly and adequately 
addressed.  Habitual residence is such an issue that the Restatement (Third) could 
not, and should not, ignore.           
I. INTRODUCTION
In conflict of laws, determination of an applicable law or jurisdiction often 
depends on a relationship between a person, thing or conduct and a certain 
geographic location or a particular sovereign nation.1 Such a relationship is 
commonly called a connecting factor.2 Among the connecting factors, domicile or 
nationality has been the notable factor that serves as a link between a person and a 
legal system,3 and affects choice of law as well as jurisdiction.4 Conceptually, the 
law to which a person is subject on the basis of affiliation is called personal law or 
law of person in the conflict of law literature.  It is the law that often applies to 
such personal matters as civil capacity, marriage, inheritance, and other family 
relations, or personal status in general.5 A well-accepted notion in conflict of laws 
is that the personal law follows the person and determines the person’s important 
legal interests.6 As a quite settled choice-of-law rule, personal law governs a 
particular person or class of persons wherever situated.7
                                                                                                                                
* James E. Beasley Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law.
1 See PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEIONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 286 
(5th ed. 2010). 
2 See generally Stephen Szászy, The Basic Connecting Factor in International Cases in the 
Domain of Civil Procedure, 15 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 436 (1966).
3 See id. at 475–76.
4 See David F. Cavers, “Habitual Residence”: A Useful Concept?, 21 AM. U. L. REV. 475, 475 
(1972).
5 See GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 85–118 (2012).
6 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11 cmt. c (AM. LAW. INST. 1971).
7 See id.
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Traditionally, in the common law countries, the personal law refers to the 
law of the place of the person’s domicile, while in most civil law countries it is the 
law of the country of the person’s nationality.8 In its application, domicile, in 
addition to its significance to choice of law, also constitutes a ground of personal 
jurisdiction due to its geographic nature.9 In the U.S., for example, it is commonly 
held that a defendant in a civil action is always amenable to the general jurisdiction 
of a court of the defendant’s domicile.10 Nationality, however, is mainly concerned 
with the governing law.  The proposition of making nationality a connecting factor 
is that the national law should govern the person with respect to status and 
capacity, family relations, and succession.11 Under the 1803 French Civil Code, for 
example, the laws relating to the status and the capacity of persons were binding 
upon French subjects even when residing abroad.12 At that time, the prevailing 
notion was that the “citizens can be governed personally only by the law of the 
community of which they are members.”13
It has been observed that the contrast between nationality and domicile in 
determining personal status is “deeply rooted in . . . traditions and policies,”14 and
that “the near future holds no prospect of its elimination” as far as the personal law 
is concerned.15 In the past decades, however, there has been a sweeping change in 
the civil law countries, particularly in Europe, in the area of personal law.  As a 
result, the concept of habitual residence has been employed to replace nationality 
for purposes of choice of laws.  In the meantime, this change also has great impacts 
on the application of domicile.
At the beginning, habitual residence was used to determine personal law 
in the international conventions mainly concerning the matters of family law, 
including guardianship, child custody, marital status, and other family issues.16 It 
has now become a major connecting factor in continental Europe for the matters of 
both jurisdiction and choice of law.17 During the course of change, the application 
of habitual residence has been expanded from family law to many other areas 
including contracts and torts.  For instance, in the 2008 EU Regulation on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I) and the 2007 EU Regulation on the 
Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Rome II), habitual residence is 
                                                                                                                                
8 See id.
9 See L.I. DE WINTER, NATIONALITY OR DOMICILE? THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS, 3 Recueil 
Des Cours, 357 (1969); see also Cavers, supra note 4, at 475.
10 See WILLIAM M. RICHMAN, WILLIAM L REYNOLD & CHRISTOPHER A. WHYTOCK,
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS 5 (4th ed. 2013). 
11 See Kurt H. Nadelmann, Mancini’s Nationality Rule and Non-Unified Legal Systems: 
Nationality versus Domicile, 17 AM. J. COMP. L. 418 (1969). 
12 See Ernest G. Lorenzen, The French Rules of Conflict of Laws, 38 YALE L. J. 165 (1928).
13 DE WINTER, supra note 9, at 368.
14 Id. at 357.
15 Id.
16 See Kurt H. Nadelmann, Habitual Residence and Nationality As Tests at the Hague: The 1968 
Convention on Recognition of Divorces, 47 TEX L. REV. 766 (1969); see also Cavers, supra note 4, at 
477–79. 
17 See Pippa Rogerson, Habitual Residence: The New Domicile, 49 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 86 
(2000); see also Rafal Manko, “Habitual Residence” as Connecting Factor in EU Civil Justice 
Measures, LIBRARY OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Jan. 22, 2013), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2013/130427/LDM_BRI(2013)130427_REV1_
EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/KV2X-N8V2].
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provided as a primary connecting factor for the determination of the governing law 
in contracts, torts, and related areas.18
Elsewhere outside Europe, the concept of habitual residence has also been 
accepted in many countries in their conflict of law legislation.  In China, the 2010 
Choice of Law Statute makes habitual residence a basic connecting factor for 
choice of law.19 In Japan, under the General Rules of Application of Law (as 
revised 2006), the governing law of the formalities of a consumer contract is the 
law of the consumer’s habitual residence.20 In addition, habitual residence is 
employed in Japan as an alternative to nationality in the determination of the law 
applicable to the effect of marriage.21 Canada has also adopted habitual residence 
as a major connecting factor as preferred to the common law concept of domicile.22
In the U.S., however, application of habitual residence remains, in and of 
itself, an unsettled issue.  The codification of the Hague Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction (“Child Abduction Convention”) in the 
U.S. requires that the courts apply habitual residence instead of domicile,23 but 
there is no general acceptance of habitual residence as a common connecting factor 
in American conflict of laws.  In addition, although it has been acknowledged in 
U.S. courts that habitual residence is “a well-established concept in the Hague 
Conference,”24 the extent to which habitual residence is applied appears to be 
limited to the goal of meeting “the need for uniform international interpretation” of 
the conventions or treaties. 25
Ever since the U.S. ratified the Child Abduction Convention in 1988, there 
has been a question about whether habitual residence should be adopted as a 
connecting factor to replace, or at least as an alternative to, domicile in general.26
In fact, even before the Child Abduction Convention was adopted, it had been 
suggested in the American conflict of laws community that habitual residence be 
employed to “aid in resolving conflicts between state laws and also interstate 
                                                                                                                                
18 See Monko, supra, note 17.
19 The Choice of Law statute of China refers to the Statute of Application of Law to Foreign Civil 
Relations.  The Statute was adopted on October 28, 2010, effective April 1, 2011.  For general 
discussion about the Choice of Law Statute, see Mo Zhang, Codified Choice of Law in China: Rules, 
Processes and Theoretical Underpinnings, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 83 (2011). 
20 General Rules of Application of Law, art. 11, para. 5 (2006) (Japan); see Kent Anderson & 
Yasuhiro Okuda, Translation of Japan’s Private International Law: Act on the General Rules of 
Application of Laws, 8 APLPJ 138, 145 (2006).
21 General Rules of Application of Law, art. 25 (2006) (Japan). 
22 See James G. McLeod, DEP’T OF JUSTICE CAN., THE MEANING OF ORDINARY RESIDENCE AND 
HABITUAL RESIDENCE IN THE COMMON LAW PROVINCES IN A FAMILY LAW CONTEXT 3 (2006), 
http://justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/fl-lf/divorce/rhro_cl/pdf/rhro_cl.pdf [https://perma.cc/KU9Z-SL8K].  
23 International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11 (1988).  In the meantime, 
in other international treaties to which the United States is a member, application of habitual residence is 
also required.  These treaties include, for example, the Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and
on Their Recognition (1985), and the Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect 
of Inter-Country Adoption (1993).  For a general discussion, see Gadi Zohar, Habitual Residence: An 
Alternative to the Common Law Concept of Domicile?, 9 WHITTIER J. CHIL. & FAM. ADV. 169 (2009).
24 See Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2001).
25 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11.
26 The United States was one of the first nations to sign the Convention in 1981, but the 
Convention did not enter into force for the United States until 1988 when it was ratified. See Zohar, 
supra note 23, at 203–04. 
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problems of judicial jurisdiction.”27 It was believed that the concept of habitual 
residence would be “useful in domestic as well as international cases.”28
Nowadays, the use of habitual residence as a major connecting factor in 
conflict of law has become a growing trend internationally.29 This development 
indeed poses challenges to American conflict of law.  It is natural to wonder 
whether the U.S. is going to join the mainstream or to stay isolated in this regard.  
In the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (“Second Restatement”), domicile 
is considered the predominant factor with regard to “judicial jurisdiction; choice of 
law . . . and governmental benefits and burdens.”30 Following the common law 
tradition, the Second Restatement makes domicile, for purposes of choice of law, 
decisive “in matters where continuity of application of the same law is important, 
as family law and decedents’ estates,” 31 leaving no room for habitual residence.  
The Second Restatement was adopted in 1971.  At that time, international 
issues were deemed to have “played a marginal role in American conflicts law.”32
As a result, the Second Restatement has much of its focus on the interstate matters 
and limited attention to international conflicts.33 Because of its lack of 
international orientation, the Second Restatement is described as “a product . . . of 
the simultaneous heyday of parochialism in American conflicts theory.”34 In many 
aspects, the Second Restatement is now considered inadequate to serve today’s 
needs given the dramatic changes in the conflict of laws both at home and abroad.35
A number of approaches adopted in the Second Restatement, or even American 
conflict of laws in general, are in many respects incompatible with the common 
practices elsewhere in the world.  One example is the connection requirement for 
the choice of law by the parties.36 In the U.S., contractual choice of law is 
permissible only if the law of the jurisdiction chosen bears a certain relationship 
with the parties or the transactions involved.37 In many other countries, however, 
                                                                                                                                
27 See Cavers, supra note 4, at 491.
28 See id. at 493.
29 See HAY, supra note 1, at 299–300.
30 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11, cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
31 See id.
32 Mathias Reinmann, A New Restatement – For the International Age, 75 IND. L.J. 575, 579 
(2000). 
33 See HAY, supra note 1, at 75–76.
34 Reinmann, supra note 32, at 578. Fairly speaking, however, compared with its predecessor the 
Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws, the Second Restatement does contain certain rules or 
approaches that are in common with international practices.  The highly remarkable one is the doctrine 
of the most significant relationship, which is similar to the “closest connection concept” widely used in 
Europe and many other countries.  The other one is the “party autonomy principle” that allows the 
parties to choose the law governing their contracts.  Under the First Restatement, the parties were given 
no right to make a choice of law. See HAY, supra note 1, at 1086–87.
35 See generally HAY, supra note 1, at 72–78; Gene R. Shreve, Preparing for the Next Century—A
New Restatement of Conflicts: Introduction, 75 IND. L.J. 399, 399 (2000).
36 Mo Zhang, Rethinking Contractual Choice of Law: An Analysis of Relation Syndrome, 48 
STETSON L. REV. 831, 865 (2015).
37 Under both the Second Restatement and UCC, a relationship between the chosen state and the 
parties or the transaction is a prerequisite for the law chosen by the parties to be applicable.  Section 187 
of the Second Restatement deals with the law of the state chosen by the parties, which provides that:
(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights 
and duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could 
have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue.
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights 
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connection is not a factor when the contractual parties make a choice of governing 
law.38
The missing of the habitual residence in American conflict of laws is 
another example implicating the disparity between the U.S. and the international 
community in the area of conflict of laws.  In 2000, a group of leading American 
conflict of laws scholars gathered in a symposium discussing the possibility of, and 
the timing for, the Third Conflict of Laws Restatement.39 Many of them believed 
that the Second Restatement had become obsolete and should be updated through 
adoption of the Third Restatement.40 As a response, the American Law Institute 
(“ALI”), in 2014, put into place a project to draft the Third Restatement.41
According to the ALI, the project “will reexamine the increasingly important 
subject of conflict of laws in light of significant legal developments in the field 
since the influential Restatement Second was published in 1971.”42
The Third Restatement initiative provides a great opportunity to review 
and assess American conflict of laws from both interstate and international 
perspectives.  This Article intends to take an analytical look at the concept of 
habitual residence and discusses the issues related to choice of law.  It will examine 
the needs for which habitual residence necessarily becomes a connecting factor.  
The aim of this Article is to argue for adoption of habitual residence in American 
conflict of laws.  To that end the Article offers for purposes of discussion a 
proposal of habitual residence rules.
                                                                                                                                
and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties 
could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to 
that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the 
transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' 
choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a 
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest 
than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and 
which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable law 
in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (AM. LAW. INST. 1971).
38 In Europe, the parties’ freedom to choose the applicable law is considered as one of the 
cornerstones of the system of conflict of laws rules in matters of contractual obligations.  Thus, under 
Rome I and Rome II, no relationship is necessary for the purposes of contractual choice of laws.  
According to Article 3(1) of Rome I, 
A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The choice shall be 
made expressly or clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the 
circumstances of the case. By their choice the parties can select the law applicable 
to the whole or to part only of the contract. 
Council Regulation 593/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6, 10 (EC).
39 See Symposium, Preparing for the Next Century—A New Restatement of Conflicts, 75 IND. L.J.
399 (2000).
40 See id., at 438–39.
41 See AM. LAW INST., The American Law Institute Announces Four New Projects, (Nov. 17, 
2014), https://www.ali.org/news/articles/american-law-institute-announces-four-new-projects 
[https://perma.cc/KK9X-XCZZ].
42 Restatement of the Law Third, Conflict of Laws, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
https://www.ali.org/projects/show/conflict-laws/ [https://perma.cc/8CPR-CVV8].
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Part II of the Article begins with a general review of the development of 
habitual residence in conflict of laws.  It examines how habitual residence evolved 
as a choice of law connecting factor and its methodological merits. Part III analyzes 
the conceptual aspects of habitual residence and its distinctions as compared with 
domicile.  The main theme of discussion is that as both practical and theoretical 
matters, the application of habitual residence represents a new and growing trend in 
the ascertaining of personal law as well as applicable law in other areas.  Part IV 
turns to American conflict of law literature and judicial practices in respect to 
habitual residence.  This Article argues that the application of habitual residence in 
U.S. courts as a result of implementing Hague conventions and the lack of general 
acceptance of habitual residence in the conflict of law literature pose a great 
challenge to American conflict of laws. It is the challenge that prompts a need for 
change. 
Part V calls for adoption of habitual residence in the Third Restatement.  It 
proposes to make habitual residence a necessary connecting factor for the choice of 
law in the U.S.  The proposal takes into account the common practice in 
international conflicts, aiming at making American conflict of laws more 
harmonized with new developments internationally.  In conclusion, the Article 
argues that the drafting of the Third Restatement is a unique process of reshaping 
American conflict of laws. The Second Restatement substantially departed from 
the First Restatement by incorporating the fruits of American conflict of law 
resolution.43 It is hoped and expected that the Third Restatement will reorient 
American conflict of laws to meet the need of the global integration.44
II. HABITUAL RESIDENCE AS A CONNECTING FACTOR: A METHODOLOGICAL 
EVOLUTION IN CONFLICT LAW
Habitual residence is a concept that evolved in the course of development 
of conflict of laws.  In the early stage of the conflict of laws history, domicile
served as a geographic link between a person and the law to which he was 
subject.45 Under the statutist theory that was developed by Medieval Italian jurists 
in the twelfth century to determine the governing law on the basis of statutory 
interpretation,46 statutes were classified into three categories: real, personal, and 
mixed.47 The real statutes governed property interests, which were territorially 
based.48 The personal statutes controlled issues involving personal status and they 
followed the person wherever the person was.49 The mixed statute covered other
matters, including acts done within a given territory.50
It was also believed that the key element in ascertaining personal statutes 
                                                                                                                                
43 See generally, Willis Reese, American Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., 679 (1963). 
44 See Symeon Symeonides, The Need for a Third Conflicts Restatement (And a Proposal for Tort 
Conflicts), 5 IND. L.J. 437, 446–49 (2000).
45 See Nadelmann, supra note 11, at 418. 
46 Joel Paul, The Transformation of International Comity, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 19, 21 
(2008).
47 P.M. NORTH, CHESHIRE & NORTH’S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (Butterworth & Co. 10th 
ed. 1979).
48 See DAVID CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS, at 2 (1965). 
49 Id.
50 Id.
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was the citizenry because a person was subject to the particular law of the city-state 
where the person had citizenship.51 The legal connection between the city-state 
and the person was the person’s domicile (domicilium).  The idea was that the 
domicile was the place of the person’s permanent residence and also the center of 
his private life.52 Thus, at that time the law governing a person was basically 
referred to as the law of the place of the person’s domicile.53 As a general rule, the 
law of domicile determined the legal aspects of the status of the person, or the 
personality of the person.54
In the Nineteenth Century, however, domicile as a conflict of law 
connecting factor started to fade in its importance in continental Europe as a result 
of the emergence of the concept of nationality.  A change then took place from 
domicile to nationality with respect to the law of the person.  The theoretical basis 
cementing the change was the work of Pasquale Stanislao Mancini (1817-1888), 
the Italian jurist, who regarded nationality as the fundament of international law.55
According to Mancini and his followers, the law of a nation shall be applicable to 
all the citizens of the nation, no matter where they may be.56 Therefore, under the 
nationality doctrine, all matters concerning the status of a person, including 
capacity, family relation, as well as succession, shall be governed by the national 
law of the person.57
The nationality doctrine soon triumphed in Europe and became a “golden 
standard of [p]rivate [i]nternational [l]aw” on the continent.58 As part of the 
modern codification process in the civil law system,59 many European countries, 
and non-European countries as well, adopted in their code the nationality as a 
conflict of laws rule,60 making nationality “the principal connecting factor to 
determine choice of law and the jurisdiction of their courts.”61 This development 
divided civil law countries and common law countries in the determination of 
personal law due to the common law’s keenness on domicile.  In England, for 
example, it was a settled rule that a person’s rights, and the legal effect of his acts, 
were determined by reference to the law of the country where he had his home. In
legal language, this was referred to as an individual’s domicile, a place that was not 
necessarily the country where he was residing or of which he was a citizen.62
In its application, however, the nationality doctrine triggered several 
problems that rendered its use ineffective.  The first problem was its inability to 
                                                                                                                                
51 See DE WINTER, supra note 9, at 361.
52 See id.
53 See Nadelmann, supra note 11, at 418.
54 See generally ALBERT V. DICEY & J.H.C MORRIS, CONFLICT OF LAWS, Ch.7 (10th ed., 1980).
55 See Nadelmann, supra note 11, at 420.
56 See generally, JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS OR PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 69–70 (1916).
57 Nadelmann, supra note 11, at 418.
58 See DE WINTER, supra note 9, at 373.
59 The modern codifications, which took place during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, refer 
to the process involving “a rationally organized statement of the whole field of law,” as compared to the 
early codification that was simply “a restatement of the law.” See generally, JAMES G. APPLE & ROBERT
P. DEYLING, FED. JUD. CTR., A PRIMER ON CIVIL LAW SYSTEM (1995),
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/CivilLaw.pdf [https://perma.cc/9927-MWKK].
60 See DE WINTER, supra note 9, at 373.
61 See Cavers, supra note 4, at 475.
62 See A.V. DICEY, THE LAW OF DOMICILE AS A BRANCH OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND, STATED IN 
THE FORM OF RULES 44–45 (1879).
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cope with the situation where a person’s nationality could not be identified or 
where the person had no nationality.63 This phenomenon of “stateless” persons 
made it impossible to determine the applicable law based on nationality.64 As a 
result, countries needed an alternative doctrine to deal with this issue. In France, 
for example, the law of domicile was considered to be the personal law of stateless 
persons.65 In addition, the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons, adopted in 1954 (Stateless Person Convention), had a clear focus 
on domicile rather than nationality in order to overcome the profound vulnerability 
that affects people who are stateless and to help resolve the practical problems they 
face in their everyday lives.66 Under Article 12 of the Stateless Person Convention, 
“the personal status of a stateless person shall be governed by the law of the 
country of his domicile or, if he has no domicile, by the law of the country of his 
residence.”67
The second problem of the nationality doctrine was the matter of dual 
citizenship. The territorial nature of the law of nationality made it possible for a 
person to legally acquire citizenship from more than one country.68 As to a person 
with dual citizenship, difficulty arose when determining the national law of the 
person.69 On the one hand, such a person would be deemed “as a national by each 
of the states whose nationality he possesses.”70 On the other hand, the 
determination would have to be made in association with other factors such as the 
principal residence of the person or the place with which the person was most 
closely related.71
A third problem of the nationality doctrine concerned the governing law 
of corporations.  With the rapid growth of the international economy, corporations, 
as legal persons, became major players in international trade and investment.72 An 
important issue that was raised with the presence of corporations in the world 
market was the legal identity or personality of corporations.73 From an international 
law perspective, there was a question of diplomatic protection of a corporation.  In 
conflict of laws, the issue concerned which law should govern the activities of the 
corporation.  Under international law, the legal identity of a corporation was tied to 
its nationality.74 But because the idea of corporate personhood is a legal fiction, 
determining its nationality could be challenging in many cases.75 In addition, unlike 
                                                                                                                                
63 See Cavers, supra note 4, at 476.
64 See BASEDOW, ET AL., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ch. 2, Nationality, 
1290–1301 (2017).
65 See DE WINTER, supra note 9, at 382.
66 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117. 
67 Id. at art.12.
68 See BASEDOW, supra note 64.
69 See DE WINTER, supra note 9, at 384–85.
70 Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws art. 3, Apr. 12, 
1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 4137.
71 Id. at art. 5.
72 See FOLSOM, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 8 (11th ed. 2012).
73 Id. (stating that a multinational corporation is easily defined).
74 See Note, The “Nationality” of International Corporations Under Civil Law and Treaty, 74
HARV. L. REV. 1429 (1961).
75 See R. L. Astorga. The Nationality of Juridical Persons in the ICSID Convention in Light of Its 
Jurisprudence, 11 MAX BLANCK Y.B. OF U.N. LAW 417, 429 (2007) (stating that there are at least three 
ways in international law to attribute nationality to juridical persons: the place of incorporation, the 
siège social or seat and the control, or substantial interest of the company).
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the nationality of natural persons that was regulated by national law, there was a 
lack of provisions related to the nationality of corporations in most national laws.76
Also problematic was the term “nationality” itself. Conceptually, 
nationality is a political rather than a civil term, and it refers to the legal 
relationship between a person and a sovereign state.77 For purposes of public 
international law, nationality affords the person the protection of the state and also 
gives the state the right to protect him from other states.78 In conflict of laws, 
however, the civil matter focus often makes the locale of presence more relevant 
than the personal affiliation with regard to the civil rights and obligations of the 
person, including personal status.79 The reliance on nationality was further 
undermined by the increasing mobility of people crossing country borders.80       
The deficiency of nationality as a connecting factor in conflict of laws 
necessitated a call for alternatives.  The choice was either to return to the principle 
of domicile or to search for another solution.81 Some countries, such as Italy and 
Brazil, simply switched back to the principle of domicile.82 Other countries started 
to explore a mixed approach under which only the “personal status of their own 
nationals was subject to the national law” while “that of all foreigners was to be 
governed by the law of their residence.”83 Many seriously doubted that domicile 
would be an optimal choice because there had been a growing “objection . . . 
against a rule of conflicts of laws based on the domicile principle.”84 As a result, a 
new and different concept of habitual residence, emerged.
The preference of habitual residence over domicile is due at least in part to 
the difficulties encountered with domicile.  First, the concept of domicile as used in 
the common law system differs from that understood in the civil law system.  In 
Great Britain, for instance, the concept of domicile is described as the place where 
a person considers where his roots are or where the person has his permanent 
home85 and the focal point is the connection between a person and a given system 
or rule of law.86 This concept is considered as more closely resembling “the 
                                                                                                                                
76 See id. at 426.
77 Nationality, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (explaining that nationality determines 
the political status of the individual, especially with reference to allegiance); see also W. R. Bisschop, 
Nationality in International Law, 37 AM. J. INT’L L. 320 (1943).
78 See Bisschop, supra note 77, at 321 (“Nationality, that is to say, membership of a State, is the 
link through which an individual can enjoy the benefits of the law of nations.”).
79 See Law Reform Commission, Domicile and Habitual Residence 1, 7-15, 
http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/consultation%20papers/wpHabitualResidence.htm 
[https://perma.cc/MFS2-DA2K] (“The law of the country of one's permanent home, which is the notion 
of domicile, is arguably a more appropriate one by which to determine questions of status and property 
than that of one's nationality, with which one may have little or no practical connection.  For example, 
an Irishman emigrating to the United States may never obtain citizenship in that country but may live 
for fifty years in New York and never return to Ireland or have any interest in doing so.  It may be 
argued that to apply Irish law to questions of that man's status or of his property at the time of his death 
(which an application of nationality as a connecting factor would require) is less appropriate than to 
apply the law of New York, where he had long since become domiciled and with which he had . . . ‘the 
most real connexion [sic].’”).
80 See Cavers, supra note 4, at 476.
81 See id. at 477.
82 See DE WINTER, supra note 9, at 407. 
83 See id. at 412–13.
84 See id. at 419.
85 See DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 78 (J. H. C. Morris ed., 8th ed. 1967). 
86 See id. at 79.
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continental notion of nationality” than “the continental concept of domicile as 
residence.”87
Secondly, the law of domicile is deemed to be “complex and in a number 
of respects” uncertain88 because it is used to serve “too many diverse purposes.”89
In common law systems, domicile is further divided into three categories: domicile 
of origin; domicile of choice; and domicile of dependency.  Each of the categories 
is subject to different rules.90 There are two basic rules pertaining to domicile: “no 
person can be without a domicile” and “no person can at the same time for the 
same purpose have more than one domicile.”91 The provisions governing domicile 
may vary dramatically in different countries.  Thus, confusion often arises when a 
person possesses two or more “homes” and dispute always occurs in the case where 
the domicile of dependents is in question.92
Thirdly, perhaps the most controversial aspect of domicile is the 
“subjective inferences” that are required to find a domicile.93 In most cases, for the 
determination of a person’s domicile, domicile of choice in particular, the intention 
of the person as to his permanent or definite residence is an indispensable 
element.94 Therefore, the state of mind by which a person regards a place as their 
permanent residence is decisive for finding domicile.95 But it is often difficult to 
prove the intention. The question always raised is how to find the actual intent of a 
person.  Courts in many cases would have to combine both subjective and objective 
factors in order to find a domicile, especially when the fact of residence of a person 
contradicts the person’s subjective choice,96 or in the situation that the person has 
multiple homes.97
Habitual residence is considered different from domicile although they are 
related in terms of residence.98 Unlike domicile that contains uncertainties of 
meaning and requires proof of subjective intent,99 habitual residence by its term is 
more intuitive, and is considered ascertainable based on “the ordinary and natural 
                                                                                                                                
87 See DE WINTER, supra note 9, at 419.
88 LAW REFORM COMM’N OF IR., DOMICILE AND HABITUAL RESIDENCE (1983), ch. 2, § 7, 
http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/Reports/rHabitualResidence.htm [https://perma.cc/6FAC-WA7K].
89 Russell J. Weintraub, An Inquiry into the Utility of “Domicile” as a Concept in Conflicts 
Analysis, 63 MICH. L. REV. 961, 984 (1965).
90 See DICEY AND MORRIS, supra note 85, at 84, 86, 107. 
91 Id. at 81–82.
92 See DE WINTER, supra note 9, at 421–22. With regard to domicile of dependency, the so-called 
proleptic (anticipatory) domicile is considered even more confusing; see LAW REFORM COMM’N OF IR.,
supra note 88, at 6 (“[A] wife has at common law the domicile of her husband.  However, if her 
husband is domiciled abroad, she may, in England and in Scotland, if the marriage has been annulled or 
dissolved by a court of the domicile, seek a declaration or declarator as to the validity of the foreign 
annulment or foreign divorce, hoping that it will not be granted.  The court in England and in Scotland, 
in order to assume jurisdiction, accepts without argument that the facts as alleged in her petition are 
correct, thus deeming her to have acquired an English or Scottish domicile and allowing her to have the 
court refuse recognition to her husband’s foreign decree.”).  
93 Weintraub, supra note 89, at 984.
94 See DICEY AND MORRIS, supra note 85, at 86.
95 See HAY, supra note 1, at 308.
96 See Leon Trakman, Domicile of Choice in English Law: An Achilles Heel? 11 J. PRIV. INT’L L.
317, 325–26 (2015).
97 See HAY, supra note 1, at 310–12.
98 See Zohar, supra note 23, at 171.  In one place for example, domicile is defined as the place 
where a person habitually resides. See Nadelmann, Habitual Residence, supra note 16, at 768.
99 HAY, supra note 1, at 300.
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meaning of the . . . words which it contains,” namely “habitual” and “residence.”100
From a practical point of view, habitual residence, as compared with domicile, is 
deemed more factual and manageable.101 Therefore, after it was introduced, 
habitual residence soon became an important conflict of law connecting factor.102
Now habitual residence is being widely accepted as a basic rule in continental 
European countries through the Hague conventions and also incorporated into the 
legislation in many common law countries, including England and Canada.103
III.  CONCEPT OF HABITUAL RESIDENCE: DISTINCTIONS AND APPLICATION
Acceptance of habitual residence as a connecting factor for choice of law 
as well as jurisdiction represents a trend of development of modern conflict of 
laws.104 A highly remarkable feature of this development is the role of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, “[a] melting pot of different legal 
traditions,”105 to promote legal harmony in its member states.  As the world 
organization for cross-border cooperation in civil and commercial matters, the 
Hague Conference whose work now encompasses 150 countries has elaborated a 
wide range of uniform conventions under its stated mission of “progressive 
unification” of private international law rules.106 One of the Hague’s notable 
achievements is perhaps the adoption of habitual residence, making this connecting 
factor a well-accepted conflict of law rule.107
A.  Habitual Residence in the Hague Conventions
Habitual residence is generally understood to have been used for the first 
time, for conflict of laws purposes, in 1902 when the Hague Convention on the 
Settlement of Guardianship of Minors was adopted.108 It has been observed, 
however, that the term had previously been used in a number of bilateral treaties, 
including a treaty in France and Prussia of 1880.  Habitual residence was also 
contained in Hague Convention on Civil Procedures of 1896.109 Under Article 3 of 
the 1902 Guardianship Convention, the guardianship of the minor who habitually 
resides abroad is established and exercised in accordance with the law of the place 
of the minor’s habitual residence.110 If the minor’s guardianship is not, or if it 
                                                                                                                                
100 Re J. (A Minor) [1990] 2 AC 562 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.).
101 Nadelmann, supra note 16, at 767.
102 See DAVID MCCLEAN & KISCH BEEVERS, The Conflict of Laws 24 (7th ed. 2009) (“Habitual 
residence has long been a favourite expression of the Hague Conference on Private International Law 
and appears in many Hague conventions . . . .”). 
103 See generally McLeod, supra note 22.
104 Rogerson, supra note 17, at 86.
105 About HCCH, A World Organization, HCCH https://www.hcch.net/en/about
[https://perma.cc/9UXT-E8FC ].
106 Id.
107 See Elisa Perez-Vera Report, Explanatory Report, para. 66 (1981), 
https://assets.hcch.net/upload/expl28.pdf [https://perma.cc/G24H-CXXX] [hereinafter Perez-Vera 
Report].
108 See RONA SCHUZ, THE HAGUE CHILD ABDUCTION CONVENTION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 176 
(Hart Publishing Ltd., 2013); see also Manko, supra note 17; Cavers, supra note 4, at 477.
109 See DE WINTER, supra note 9, at 423.
110 See CONVENTION OF 12 JUNE 1902 RELATING TO THE SETTLEMENT OF GUARDIANSHIP OF 
MINORS (2008), https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/the-old-conventions/1902-guardianship-
convention [https://perma.cc/PXK6-ZPER] (CONVENTION DU 12 JUIN 1902 POUR RÉGLER LA 
TUTELLE DES MINEURS).
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could not be, settled according to his national law, then the law of his habitual 
residence shall apply.111 Apparently, habitual residence as used in the 1902 
Guardianship Convention was simply a supplement to the principle of nationality.
The Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, 
Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures 
for the Protection of Children (Children Protection Convention), which concluded 
in 1996, is regarded as the replacement of the 1902 Guardianship Convention.112 In 
contrast to the 1902 Guardianship Convention, the 1996 Children Protection 
Convention took a more direct approach to utilizing habitual residence. It not only 
made habitual residence a primary connecting factor, but also extended application 
of habitual residence to the determination of jurisdiction as well. 
Under Article 5 of the 1996 Children Protection Convention, the judicial 
or administrative authorities of the Contracting State of the child’s habitual 
residence have jurisdiction to take measures directed to the protection of the child's 
person or property.113 In addition, “[i]n case of a change of the child's habitual 
residence to another Contracting State, the authorities of the State of the new 
habitual residence, [subject to certain conditions,] have jurisdiction.”114 Pursuant to 
Article 16, “[t]he attribution or extinction of parental responsibility by operation of 
law, without the intervention of a judicial or administrative authority, is governed 
by the law of the State of the habitual residence of the child.”115 Article 16 also 
provides that “[t]he attribution or extinction of parental responsibility by an 
agreement or a unilateral act, without intervention of a judicial or administrative 
authority, is governed by the law of the State of the child’s habitual residence at the 
time when the agreement or unilateral act takes effect.”116
The provisions of the 1996 Children Protection Convention that involve 
habitual residence reflect the overall favorable attitude of the member states of the 
Hague conventions toward the concept of habitual residence.  As a matter of fact, 
since 1902, there have been at least fourteen Hague conventions that contain 
provisions of habitual residence in the areas of marriage, child protection, and 
succession with respect to governing law.117 In addition, several conventions 
                                                                                                                                
111 See id.
112 See TREVOR BUCK, INTERNATIONAL CHILD LAW, 51 n.30 (Rutledge, 3rd ed. 2014).  In fact, the 
1996 Children Protection Convention is a revision of the 1961 Convention concerning the Powers of 
Authorities and the Law Applicable in Respect of the Protection of Minors. See CONVENTION ON 
JURISDICTION, APPLICABLE LAW, RECOGNITION, ENFORCEMENT AND CO-OPERATION IN RESPECT OF 
PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MEASURES FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN (1996), 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=70#ch3 [https://perma.cc/K72X-LK4R]. 
113 CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION, supra note 110, art. 5(1).
114 Id. art. 5(2).
115 Id. art. 16(1).
116 Id. art. 16(2).
117 These conventions include Convention of 17 July 1905 on Deprivation of Civil Rights; 
Convention of 24 October 1956 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations towards Children; 
Convention of 5 October 1961 Concerning the Powers of Authorities and the Law Applicable in Respect 
of the Protection of Infants; Convention of 5 October 1961 on the Conflicts of Laws relating to the Form 
of Testamentary Dispositions; Convention of 15 November 1965 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and 
Recognition of Decrees Relating to Adoptions; Convention of 2 October 1973 on the Law Applicable to 
Maintenance Obligations; Convention of 14 March 1978 on the Law Applicable to Matrimonial 
Property Regimes; Convention of 14 March 1978 on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of 
Marriages; Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction; 
Convention of 1 August 1989 on the Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons; 
Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-
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concerning other civil and commercial matters to which habitual residence is 
applicable have been adopted under the auspice of the Hague Conference.118 In 
those conventions, the principle of habitual residence is applied in four different 
ways: (1) application alone, meaning that habitual residence is the sole connecting 
factor;119 (2) application as one of options, using habitual residence along with 
other connecting factors;120 (3) orderly application, either supplementing to or to be 
supplemented by other connecting factors;121 or (4) cross application, using 
habitual residence in conjunction with other connecting factors.122
                                                                                                                                
operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children; Convention 
of 13 January 2000 on the International Protection of Adults; Convention of 23 November 2007 on the 
International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance; and Protocol of 23 
November 2007 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations.
118 E.g., Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, Dec. 22, 1986; Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Agency, Mar. 14, 1978; Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, Oct. 2, 1973; Hague Convention on the Law 
Applicable to International Sales of Goods, June 15, 1955. 
119 Under Article 1 of the 1956 Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations 
towards Children, the law of habitual residence of children determines whether, how, and to whom the 
child may claim maintenance. Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations 
towards Children art. 1, Oct. 24, 1956, HCCH (The law of the habitual residence of the child determines 
whether, how and to whom the child may claim maintenance). 
120 According to the 1978 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Matrimonial Property
Regimes, the matrimonial property regime is governed by the internal law designated by the spouses 
before marriage.  Article 3 provides that the spouses may designate only one of the following laws: 
(1) the law of any State of which either spouse is a national at the time of designation; (2) the law of the 
State in which either spouse has his habitual residence at the time of designation; (3) the law of the first 
State where one of the spouses establishes a new habitual residence after marriage. Hague Convention 
on the Law Applicable to Matrimonial Property Regimes, art. 3, Mar. 14, 1978, HCCH. 
121 Orderly application of habitual residence principle in the Hague conventions takes two forms: 
supplemental to, or supplemented by, another connecting factor.  Article 3 of the 1902 Guardianship 
Convention exemplified the former. See Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, 
Enforcement and Co-Operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of 
Children, supra note 110. The latter is the one as provided in the Hague Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Maintenance Obligations: 
The internal law of the habitual residence of the maintenance creditor shall 
govern the maintenance obligations referred to . . . .  In the case of a change in 
the habitual residence of the creditor, the internal law of the new habitual 
residence shall apply as from the moment when the change occurs (art.4).  If 
the creditor is unable, by virtue of the law referred to in Article 4, to obtain 
maintenance from the debtor, the law of their common nationality shall apply 
(art. 5).  If the creditor is unable, by virtue of the laws referred to in Articles 4 
and 5, to obtain maintenance from the debtor, the internal law of the authority 
seised shall apply (art. 6). 
Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations, art. 4, Oct. 2, 1973, HCCH. 
122 Cross application refers to the situation where habitual residence applies in conjunction with 
another connecting factor.  Take the 1973 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products 
Liability for example.  Article 4 reads as follows: 
The applicable law shall be the internal law of the State of the place of injury, if 
that State is also –
a) the place of the habitual residence of the person directly suffering damage, or 
b) the principal place of business of the person claimed to be liable, or 
c) the place where the product was acquired by the person directly suffering 
damage. 
Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, art. 4, Oct. 2, 1973, HCCH.
Article 5 further provides the following:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 4, the applicable law shall be the 
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Acceptance of habitual residence in Hague conventions started at first as a 
compromise of the contention between common law’s domicile doctrine and civil
law’s nationality approach.123 During the drafting of early Hague conventions, a 
considerable amount of debate was generated on the finding of a middle ground.124
Given the rigid rules of domicile, the need of departing from nationality, and in 
light of promoting unification of conflict of law provisions, habitual residence was 
taken as an option to avoid “the notion of domicile so as to end all difficulties 
resulting from the definition of that term.”125 In this context, then, the law of 
habitual residence was suggested to replace the law of domicile to handle dual 
nationals.126
However, the status of habitual residence as a major connecting factor was 
not firmly established in Hague conventions until 1956.127 In the Convention on
the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations towards Children adopted on 
October 24, 1956 (“1956 Children Maintenance Convention”), it was clearly 
provided that the obligations of child maintenance is determined by the law of 
habitual residence of children.128 For the first time, the 1956 Children Maintenance 
Convention explicitly used habitual residence as the single principal connecting 
factor to determine applicable law.129 Later, this approach again played “a main 
role” in the 1970 Convention on Divorces and Legal Separations for the 
determination of jurisdiction.130
                                                                                                                                
internal law of the State of the habitual residence of the person directly suffering 
damage, if that State is also –
a) the principal place of business of the person claimed to be liable, or 
b) the place where the product was acquired by the person directly 
suffering damage. 
Id., art. 5. 
123 See Nadelmann, supra note 16, at 767. See also Cavers, supra note 4, at 479.
124 See Nadelmann, supra note 16, at 767–68. See also DE WINTER, supra note 9, at 422–23. 
125 See DE WINTER, supra note 9, at 424; Nadelmann, supra note 16, at 767. 
126 See DE WINTER, supra note 9, at 424.
127 See Cavers, supra note 4, at 478. 
128 Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations Toward Children, The Hague 
Con. on Priv. Int’l L., art. 4, Oct.  22, 1956, www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=37 
[https://perma.cc/4TBC-WLG3]. 
129 See id.
130 Cavers, supra note 4, at 478–79. The Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal 
Separations was adopted June 1, 1970.  Under Article 2 of the 1970 Convention:
Such divorces and legal separations shall be recognized in all other 
Contracting States, subject to the remaining terms of this Convention, if, at the 
date of the institution of the proceedings in the State of the divorce or legal 
separation (hereinafter called "the State of origin"): (1) the respondent had his 
habitual residence there; or (2) the petitioner had his habitual residence there 
and one of the following further conditions was fulfilled - a) such habitual 
residence had continued for not less than one year immediately prior to the 
institution of proceedings; b) the spouses last habitually resided there together; 
or (3) both spouses were nationals of that State; or (4) the petitioner was a 
national of that State and one of the following further conditions was fulfilled 
- a) the petitioner had his habitual residence there; or b) he had habitually 
resided there for a continuous period of one year falling, at least in part, within 
the two years preceding the institution of the proceedings; or(5) the 
petitioner for divorce was a national of that State and both the following 
further conditions were fulfilled -a) the petitioner was present in that State at 
the date of institution of the proceedings and b) the spouses last habitually 
resided together in a State whose law, at the date of institution of the 
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With regard to the use of habitual residence, the Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction (“Child Abduction Convention”) is 
highly notable and influential convention. Adopted October 24, 1980, the Child 
Abduction Convention makes habitual residence the key determinant of applicable 
law.131 Under the Child Abduction Convention, habitual residence not only affects 
the law that governs the right of child custody,132 but also determines the scope of 
the application of the Convention itself.133 The Child Abduction Convention now 
has ninety-four member states,134 and is viewed as one of the most successful 
family law instruments to be completed under the auspices of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law.135 According to the Hague Conference, 
“the operation of the [Child Abduction Convention] has been further strengthened 
by complementing provisions in the 1996 Convention on Children Protection.”136
As noted, the Child Protection Convention firmly establishes habitual residence as 
a primary connecting factor in conflict of laws for the matters with which the 
Convention is intended to deal.137
The most recent Hague convention was the 2007 Convention on the 
International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family 
Maintenance.138 It was adopted along with the Protocol on the Law Applicable to 
Maintenance Obligations (“2007 Protocol”).139  The former is mainly about 
recognition and enforcement of maintenance decisions.  The latter concerns 
determination of the law applicable to maintenance obligations arising from a 
                                                                                                                                
proceedings, did not provide for divorce.
Convention on Divorces and Legal Separations, The Hague Conf. on Pri. Int’l L., art. 2, June 1, 1970, 
www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=80 [https://perma.cc/2DD8-EADW].
131 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, The Hague Con. on Priv. 
Int’l L., art. 3, Oct. 25, 1980, www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=24 
[https://perma.cc/3XLE-XDY9].
132 See id.  Under Article 3 of the 1980 Child Abduction Convention:
[T]he removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where 
a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or 
any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the 
child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and 
b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, 
either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or 
retention.
133 Id. art. 4 (“The Convention shall apply to any child who was habitually resident in a 
Contracting State immediately before any breach of custody or access rights.  The Convention shall 
cease to apply when the child attains the age of 16 years.”).
134 See Status Table, The Hague Con. on Priv. Int’l L., Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil 
Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction, Dec. 1, 1983, 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=24 [https://perma.cc/RDK2-U2ZW]. 
135 Outline: Hague Child Abduction Convention, The Hague Conf. on Private Int’l L. (May 2014), 
https://assets.hcch.net/docs/e6a6a977-40c5-47b2-a380-b4ec3a0041a8.pdf [https://perma.cc/D4P5-
2FYL]. 
136 Id.
137 See Peter Nygh, The New Hague Child Protection Convention, 11 INT’L J. OF L., POL’Y AND 
FAM., 344–59 (1997).
138 HCCH, available at https://assets.hcch.net/docs/14e71887-0090-47a3-9c49-d438eb601b47.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JAF6-DL39].
139 Protocol on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations, The Hague Conf. on Private Int’l 
L., art. 3, Nov. 23, 2007, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=133 
[https://perma.cc/BN52-GFLX].
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family relationship, parentage, marriage or affinity, including a maintenance
obligation in respect of a child regardless of the marital status of the parents. In 
both documents, habitual residence once again is the center of focus.140 Under 
Article 3 of the 2007 Protocol, for example, the law of habitual residence of the 
creditor, as the general rule on applicable law, governs maintenance obligations.141
B. Habitual Residence: Definition and Distinctions
Despite its significance in the determination of applicable law as well as 
jurisdiction, habitual residence has, unfortunately, never been defined in Hague 
conventions, nor was any guidance given in the conventions for its 
interpretation.142 In fact, as it has been observed, the definition of habitual 
residence was deliberately left open in the conventions,143 and it has also been 
suggested not to “dwell” upon the notion of habitual residence.144 The rationale 
behind this omission was the fear of possible “loss of the advantages which would 
be derived from the latitude to adapt this notion to practical requirements.”145
Therefore, a “purely pragmatic” approach has been employed to allow courts to 
make decisions “on the basis of all factual data available and guided by their 
common[]sense.”146
But a legitimate concern is that without a definition, habitual residence 
can be difficult to prove in certain cases.147 For that reason, there have been efforts 
outside the Hague conventions to define the term.  In one occasion, habitual 
residence is described as “an individual’s abode in a particular place or country 
which he has adopted voluntarily and for settled purposes as part of the regular 
order of his life for the time being, whether of short or long duration.”148 In the 
other occasion, habitual residence is simply defined as the place where a person 
“regularly, normally, [and] customarily lives.”149 Even though no definition is 
available, it is believed that the determination is a matter of judicial interpretation, 
and such interpretation requires analysis of criteria from the ordinary meaning of 
the composite expression.150
Practically, however, no matter how the term habitual residence is defined 
or interpreted, a general understanding is that habitual residence is the place where 
                                                                                                                                
140 Id.
141 Id. (“General rule on applicable law: (1) Maintenance obligations shall be governed by the law 
of the State of the habitual residence of the creditor, save where this Protocol provides otherwise. (2) In 
the case of a change in the habitual residence of the creditor, the law of the State of the new habitual 
residence shall apply as from the moment when the change occurs.”).
142 See JAMES D. GARBOLINO, THE 1980 HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES 50, 50–53 (2d ed. 2015).
143 See DE WINTER, supra note 9, at 429; Cavers, supra note 4, at 484–87; Perez-Vera Report, 
supra note 107, § 66.
144 Perez-Vera Report, supra note 107, § 66.
145 DE WINTER, supra note 9, at 429.
146 Id. at 428–29; see also HAY, supra note 1, at 300.
147 See DE WINTER, supra note 9, at 428–29.
148 Peter Stone, The Concept of Habitual Residence in Private International Law, 29 ANGLO-AM.
L. REV. 342, 347 (2000).
149 See Gerald Goldstein, The Concepts of Habitual Residence and Ordinary Residence in Light of 
Quebec Civil Law, the Divorce Act and the Hague Conventions of 1980 and 1996, 52 DEP’T OF JUST.
CAN. 6 (2006), http://justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/fl-lf/divorce/rhro_qc/pdf/rhro_qc.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X9SE-3F2W]. 
150 JAMES STEWART, FAMILY LAW: JURISDICTION COMPARISON 29 (2011).
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a person usually lives.151 Although its determination is heavily dependent on the 
facts of a case152 and its definition varies, habitual residence is believed to contain 
three basic elements: actual residence, continuity of stay, and persistence to 
remain.153 Actual residence refers to one’s current place of living, rather than a 
place where a person is passing through.154 The second factor, “continuity of stay,”
refers to the duration of residence, so long as such duration is for an “appreciable 
period of time.”155 This is because habitual residence involves “a settled and 
enduring connection between a person and a place” and excludes temporary or 
brief stops.156 The final factor, “persistence to remain,” refers to the present mind 
of the person at issue, which must involve “a degree of settled purpose” to maintain 
his residence in the given location.157
Despite the highly fact-based analysis for habitual residence, the element 
of persistence to remain has met criticism because its determination invites an 
investigation of a person’s intention to remain.158 Confusion may arise due to the 
element’s seemingly similar nature to that of domicile. The primary concern of 
critics is that the finding of intention would be highly subjective, breeding 
uncertainty and resulting in the loss of the advantages associated with the habitual 
residence’s factual situation capable of objective ascertainment.159 Others, 
however, argue that, unlike domicile, habitual residence involves only the apparent 
rather than future intention, which implicates a weaker “animus” (mind).160 Thus, 
its determination is principally circumstantial, affected by all surrounding facts that 
are present in a given case.161
Facing the issue of defining habitual residence, the European Union has 
taken a different approach by defining the term in connection with the subject 
matter to be dealt with in specific cases.  For contractual obligations covered by 
Rome I, the habitual residence of a natural person acting in the course of business 
is defined as that person’s principal place of business.162 With regard to companies 
and other entities, whether incorporated or unincorporated, habitual residence is 
defined by the place of their central administration or nerve center.163 If a contract 
is made through and creates an obligation on a branch, agency, or any other 
establishment, the location of such branch, agency or establishment is treated as the 
place of habitual residence.164 A similar habitual residence rule is also provided in 
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Rome II, which governs non-contractual obligations, referring to torts and other 
non-contract based civil obligations.165
Definition aside, habitual residence apparently stands a better chance of 
having consensus than domicile in the international legal community, especially in 
the area of conflict of laws.  It is also evident that the trend to maintain and expand 
the use of habitual residence as a connecting factor is growing.  Compared with 
domicile, which is often hard to establish, habitual residence is considered 
“undeniably more reliable in a factual sense” because “it tends to denote a person’s 
presence over a fairly prolonged period in a certain place, and to assign only an 
incidental and non-essential role to the intention of remaining there.” 166 More 
specifically, the primary distinguishing characteristics of habitual residence include
its fact-driven nature, past experience focus, flexibility in determination, actual 
connection emphasis, and ability to ascertain intention.  
This fact-driven distinction goes to the very nature of habitual residence.  
Unlike domicile, which is deemed as “an idea of law” containing restrictive legal 
rules,167 habitual residence is considered as a fact-specific inquiry168 Given the 
high fluidity of modern society and in light of increasing internationality of civil 
and commercial activities, habitual residence “is intended to be a simple non-
technical term, applied to the facts of each case.”169 For example, under the general 
rule of domicile, a dependent person (e.g. a child) has the domicile of the person 
“on whom he is considered by law to be dependent.”170 This rule, however, could 
not adequately deal with the situation where the child is abandoned or becomes an 
orphan.  In addition, since the rule that governs domicile of children discriminates 
between legitimate and illegitimate children and also between their fathers and 
mothers,171 determination of their domicile must strictly and technically follow the 
provisions of law.     
Under the Child Abduction Convention, the “lawfulness of the situation 
flouted by abduction” of a child is to be determined by the law of the habitual 
residence of the child.172 According to the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(“CJEU”), to determine the child’s habitual residence, the primary consideration is 
the social and family environment comprising various factors.173 Thus, in the 
context of the Child Abduction Convention, the facts about where the child actually 
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lives are central to the inquiry.  As opined by the CJEU, the general rule is that the 
family environment of a young child is essentially “determined by the reference 
person(s) with whom the child lives, by whom the child is in fact looked after and 
taken care of.”174
The distinction of past experience focus implicates that determination of 
habitual residence is based primarily on the factual analysis of actual residence.  
Under the rule of domicile, the intent of a person to reside in a place indefinitely is 
required in order to make that place his domicile.175 Therefore, when a person who 
is domiciled in country A accepts employment in country B on a long-term basis 
and moves his whole family to country B, he would still be considered as a 
domiciliary in country A if he is found to have an intent to return to country A after 
his employment in country B ends.176 In addition, in certain cases, determination 
of domicile relies on the provision of law of the country in which he resides 
“whether or not he has his permanent home in it.”177
In contrast, habitual residence of a person mainly concerns where the 
center of the personal and family life of the person is as evidenced by the facts of 
that person’s activities, or the past experience pertaining to his residence.178 These 
facts include family status and relations, place where the person lives, duration in 
that place, situation of employment, exercise of non-remunerated activities, as well 
as others that vary on a case-by-case basis.  In international child abduction cases, 
attention is paid to the place of the child’s habitual residence, which is determined 
by looking at where the child was habitually residing at the time “immediately 
before the removal or retention . . . .”179 The determination requires a case-by-case 
“fact-specific inquiry”180 with a focus on where the rights of custody were actually 
exercised, either jointly or alone, at the time of removal or retention.181
The distinction of flexibility in determination further reflects the factual 
character of habitual residence. The flexibility is needed to adjudicate civil cases 
involving foreign elements because it enables the court to make a finding most 
suitable to the particular case.182 In conflict of laws, a reasonable balance between 
flexibility and certainty is always a concern in the determination of jurisdiction and 
choice of law.183 Insofar as habitual residence is concerned, the variety of facts in 
each case makes determination of it dependent more on circumstantial evidence 
than on that of domicile.  To maintain such flexibility is perhaps a major reason 
why the term “habitual residence” is intentionally left undefined in the Hague 
conventions.184
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Further, to maintain flexibility is purposed to allow the habitual residence 
to be determined on the basis of “the context in question” of the case.185 The 
underlying notion is that habitual residence is not purely a legal concept but rather 
a factual test.186 On the other hand, the factual basis of habitual residence would 
help overcome the difficulty faced by domicile when, for example, the domicile of 
dependency is involved.187 However, flexibility does not mean uncertainty.  It is 
believed that the adoption of habitual residence in international conventions as a 
connecting factor is an indication that the use of habitual residence would help 
achieve “an acceptable balance between [the] two extremes.”188
Emphasis on actual connection involves the process of determination of 
habitual residence.  Since the term “habitual” does not mean a mere presence but 
implicates “a degree of permanence”189 the actual connection between a person and 
a place becomes a key issue in finding whether the person has habitually resided in
that place.  In child abduction cases, for example, the major consideration in 
determining the habitual residence of a child is the child’s actual relationship or 
real and active connection with the country at issue.190 More generally, habitual 
residence implies an “enduring” connection or “durable ties” between a person and 
a place.191 Therefore, a question about a person’s habitual residence is in fact a 
question about where the person lives on a daily and regular basis,192 or where is 
the center of the person’s main interest.193
There is a concern that, compared to domicile, the connection between a 
person and a country in habitual residence is not strong enough to “justify the 
person’s civil status and affairs,” particularly in the case where foreign expatriates 
are involved.194 The concern typically arises in the expatriate situation, which is 
that the use of habitual residence in lieu of domicile would cut the links between 
the affected expatriates and their homeland.195 This concern, though legitimate, 
seems to confuse habitual residence with the concept of nationality because it 
actually is the nationality of a person that serves as a legal link between the person 
and his homeland.196
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Actually, the expatriates may encounter a dilemma when domicile is used 
as a connecting factor.  Their prolonged stay overseas may cause a problem as to 
where their domicile would be because residence is a required element for finding a 
domicile unless the concept of the domicile of origin is employed.  Under this 
circumstance, habitual residence clearly has certain advantages over domicile 
because the fact of prolonged stay would help make it more efficient to ascertain 
the law under which the civil status and affairs of the person are to be determined.  
This fact would also help enable the court to resolve the issues that are raised in 
this regard in a pragmatic and reasonable way.     
Ability to ascertain a person’s intention is perhaps the most distinctive 
feature of habitual residence as opposed to domicile.  To acquire a domicile, the 
animus manendi (intention of remaining) is an indispensable factor, which requires 
that the domiciliary have an “intention to reside permanently or for an unlimited 
time in a country.”197 Intent is also an element in the finding of habitual residence 
because to justify a habitual residence, a settled purpose or settled intention would 
be needed to indicate a contemplation to stay in a place for an appreciated period of 
time.198 Although the animus manendi is relevant in both domicile and habitual 
residence, the differences can be seen in a number of aspects.
First, the degree of reliance on intention differs.  Unlike determination of 
domicile, establishing a person’s habitual residence is less dependent on intention 
of the person.199 Since the finding of habitual residence weighs more on facts of 
residence and connection, it requires a simpler inquiry into the intention or a 
weaker animus in contrast to the finding of domicile.200 As some have indicated, 
habitual residence “tends to denote a person's presence over a fairly prolonged 
period in a certain place, and to assign only an incidental and non-essential role to 
the intention of remaining there.”201
Second, the focus of intention differs.  Domicile has a focus on the future 
intention while habitual residence attaches importance to the present or apparent 
intention.202 To determine a domicile, a considerable concern is about whether the 
person intends to live elsewhere in the future.  To illustrate, a domiciliary in Blue 
State intends to settle in Orange State.  He sells his house in Blue State, and taking 
all his effects with him, embarks for Orange State.  Under the rule of domicile, he 
immediately becomes a domiciliary in Orange State upon his arrival there because 
his intention to live in Orange State in the future controls.203 In habitual residence, 
however, the intention or settled purpose is judged by the activities of his current 
living, not by his express declaration.204 The primary issues in determining 
habitual residence involve where the person is presently living (residence) and how 
long the person has been living in that place (habitual).205
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Third, determination of intention differs. Under the rule of domicile, 
determining intention requires “an attitude of mind by which the person regards the 
place as home,”206 or in short, the mind of man.207 This process is often considered 
quite subjective208 because it heavily depends on the person’s subjective choice or 
his state of mind.209 In determining habitual residence, however, the test is quite 
objective, since attention is called to “a person’s physical connection to a place.”210
In other words, the determination of habitual residence does not emphasize 
“expressed intent,”211 but rather, evidence of objective matters.212 If a person has 
his home in a certain country, “his ‘hidden mental attitude towards [another] place’
can in no way alter the fact that he has his habitual residence in that country.”213
C.  Habitual Residence in Application
Though not defined, habitual residence as a connecting factor “has been 
consistently used in Hague conventions.”214 The growing trend in favor of habitual 
residence is readily discernable—not only in areas of family law, but also in the 
areas of commercial law in general.215 Realizing that habitual residence is less 
complex and more pragmatic than domicile, countries have shown great interest in 
making habitual residence one of the principal connecting factors in their conflict 
of law rules or at least using it as a necessary supplement to domicile.  In conflict 
of law literature, habitual residence has also become a hot subject of discussion. 
There has been a debate over application of habitual residence.  At the 
center of the debate is whether determination of habitual residence is a question of 
fact or a matter of law.  From the viewpoint of the Hague Conference, it is regarded 
as “a question of pure fact,” as far as the habitual residence of a child is 
concerned.216 The underpinning ideology is that “habitual residence has to be a 
matter of fact so that there will be uniform interpretation in all the member 
states.”217 Opponents, however, argue that the determination is a mix of fact and 
law.  Their concern is that without a certain legal standard, there will be a lack of 
guidance for interpreting fact, and, in addition, it might be difficult for having an 
appellate review when needed.218
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Although the debate is not necessarily fruitless and each argument has its 
own merits, it is generally agreed that the determination of habitual residence has 
“a largely factual emphasis.”219 It is also found that “there has never been any real 
difficulty in applying it in practice.”220 Many countries, including those in the 
common law system, have now adopted the concept of habitual residence, either 
through legislation or by court decisions.  But in order to avoid confusion, the 
legislature or courts of each country, as discussed below, tended to deal with 
habitual residence as factually specific as possible.
In civil law countries, there has been a growing trend of extensive 
application of habitual residence.  Take the European Union for example.  Habitual 
residence has become a primary connecting factor in determining the law 
applicable to both contractual obligations (Rome I) and non-contractual obligations 
(Rome II).  In addition, habitual residence has also been adopted as a choice of law 
factor in other areas such as divorce and separation (Rome III), matrimonial 
matters and parental responsibility,221 maintenance obligations,222 insolvency,223 as 
well as pending legislative proposals concerning matrimonial property,224 and 
property consequences of registered partnerships.225 In these regulations, habitual 
residence is taken as an important, though not the sole, connecting factor for both 
jurisdiction and choice of law.
In practice, the CJEU has ruled on the notion of habitual residence not 
only in the context of child abduction but also in other fields of law.226
Additionally, the CJEU has endeavored to define the habitual residence through its 
interpretation.  According to the CJEU, the concept of habitual residence means the 
place where the person concerned has established, and intends to maintain, the 
permanent or habitual center of their interests.227 Also, to help assess a person’s 
habitual residence, the CJEU has provided a guidance containing essential factors 
for the determination, including, among others, the length of residence, the length 
and purpose of absence, and the person’s apparent intention.228 Here, the CJEU 
clearly states that for the purpose of determining habitual residence, the past 
experience of residence and apparent intention of the person in question are 
decisive, implicating no future intention.  
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Besides the European Union, the provision of habitual residence can also 
be seen in the legislation of other civil law countries.  In China, as noted, the 2010 
Choice of Law Statute for the first time makes habitual residence a general 
connecting factor in foreign civil relations, applicable in all major areas of civil 
activities and affairs.229 The Choice of Law Statute is a significant piece of 
legislation in modern China that forms the basic framework of Chinese private 
international law with respect to the determination of applicable law in foreign civil 
and commercial relations.  The Choice of Law Statute regards the principle place of 
business as the habitual residence of a legal person but leaves habitual residence of 
a natural person undefined.230
In its judicial interpretation, the Supreme People’s Court of China, in 
order to implement the Choice of Law Statute, defines habitual residence of a 
natural person as a place in which the person has lived for more than one year and 
has used as the center of his living at the time the related foreign civil relation 
occurs, changes, or terminates, except for seeking medical treatment, job 
dispatching, or business purposes.231 In addition, under the Supreme People’s 
Court’s interpretation, a Chinese national who is a habitual resident in some place
outside of China shall be considered as a “foreign element” which would trigger 
the application of the Choice of Law Statute.
In 2005, Bulgaria adopted its first Code on Private International Law.  
Under Article 48 of the Code, the national law of a person who has dual foreign 
nationalities, is a stateless person, or is a refugee shall be the law of his habitual 
residence.232 For purposes of the Code, habitual residence is meant to be “the place 
where the said person has settled predominantly to live without this being related to 
a need of registration or authorization of residence or settlement.”233 Pursuant to 
the Code, in order to determine habitual residence “special regard must be had to 
circumstances of personal or professional nature arising from sustained connections 
of the person with the said place or from the intention of the said person to 
establish such connections.”234
Major common law countries, like England, have a tradition of adherence 
with domicile.235 This tradition however, appears to have changed in the past 
decades.  The change at least partly is a result of implementation of the Hague 
conventions.  In the United Kingdom, given the difficulties of proving intention as 
required with domicile, there was a call for a reform on the law of domicile as early 
as 1952.236 Since the 1960s, as a factor supplemental to domicile, habitual 
residence has been adopted in several statutes concerning succession and domestic 
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relations.237 Under the 1963 Wills Act, for example, habitual residence is used as 
one of the connecting factors to determine the law that governs the formal validity 
of a will.238 Moreover, the United Kingdom has also adopted a statutory residence 
test to determine other purposes such as taxation and social benefits.239
In addition to the statutory provisions, English courts, as well as the House 
of Lords, have developed a set of case law on habitual residence, mostly with 
respect to children.  In the landmark case of Re J (A Minor) (Abduction: Custody 
Rights), the House of Lords was asked whether a child had ceased to be habitually 
resident in Western Australia when his mother took him away with the settled 
intention of living in England.  Lord Brandon of Oakbrook addressed, among 
others, two basic rules.240 First, the expression “habitually resident” shall be 
understood according to the ordinary and natural meaning of the two words that it 
contains.241 Second, the question whether a person is or is not habitually resident 
in a specified country is a question of fact to be decided by reference to all the 
circumstances of any particular case.242
In the past few years, to further clarify the particular issue concerning the 
habitual residence of a child, the UK Supreme Court (former the Appellate 
Committee of the House of Lords) took several cases and ruled on habitual 
residence concerning such matters as jurisdiction,243 factual determinations,244
intentions of child,245 and circumstances of loss of a child’s habitual residence (the 
requisite degree of disengagement from his social and family environment).246 In 
In the Matter of A., the court reiterated that habitual residence is “essentially 
factual” and “should not be glossed with legal concepts which would produce a 
different result from that which the factual inquiry would produce.”247 In a 2016 
decision, the same court addressed a shift from a traditional dependence on parental 
intention to focusing on the child’s situation (i.e., the degree of integration by the 
child in a social and family environment) in order to better serve the interests of the 
child.248
Note, however, that the concept of habitual residence in the United 
Kingdom is distinct from how the concept is understood in continental Europe.  In 
one respect, habitual residence is often intertwined with the term “ordinary 
residence” used in British law.249 It is believed in the United Kingdom that “there 
is no real distinction between the two concepts,” or at least that “they share a 
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common core of meaning.”250 According to the House of Lords, ordinary residence 
means a regular habitual mode of life in a particular place for the time being, 
adopted for a settled purpose.251 Perhaps from this perspective, habitual residence 
is a “relatively new concept in English domestic law.”252 There is an ongoing 
debate on whether and how these two terms differ from each other.253 But the UK 
Supreme Court has taken the position that “the interpretation in [the English courts] 
of the concept of habitual residence should be consonant with its international 
interpretation.”254 The UK Supreme Court has also held that the English concept of 
habitual residence should be governed by the criteria set out in the jurisprudence of 
CJEU.255
Despite this, under British domestic law, it is possible that a person could 
be regarded as having two habitual residences because, when deciding jurisdiction, 
an English court must determine if the person in question is habitually resident in 
England, regardless of whether the person has habitually resided elsewhere.256 This 
situation may also occur in the case of a person who has spent roughly equal 
amounts of time in England and another country.257 According to the EU rule 
based on Brussels II Revised, however, a person cannot be a habitual resident in 
more than one country at the same time.258 The basic test—center of interests—
holds that a person can have only one center of his interests.259
In Canada, the concept of habitual residence via the Hague convention has 
now become part of Canadian law.260 The adoption of habitual residence in 
Canada is said to “avoid the rigid and arbitrary rules that have come to surround the 
concept of ‘domicile.’”261 Most provinces in Canada that have adopted Hague 
conventions have accepted “habitual residence” in preference to “domicile.”262 As 
a result, habitual residence is employed in Canada as a major connecting factor in 
resolving “international or interprovincial jurisdiction and choice of law issues.”263
The province of Quebec follows the civil law tradition that habitual residence is 
held as the place where he or she regularly, normally, and customarily lives, which 
requires more durable ties than mere residence.264
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Habitual residence in both Australia and New Zealand is “intended to be a 
simple non-technical term, applied to the facts of each case.”265 It is commonly 
held in these two nations that “a person’s country of habitual residence is the 
country in which a person usually lives.”266 For the purpose of habitual residence, 
“residence” refers to “a place where a person resides or lives for a settled period” 
and “habitual” implicates that “something more than occasional or short-term 
residence is required.” 267 Thus, to find habitual residence, “something more than 
occasional or short-term residence is required,” but the presence may not 
necessarily be a “continuous” one.268 Obviously then, a person “who is present in a 
country as a tourist or in transit is not habitually resident in that country.”269
IV. HABITUAL RESIDENCE IN AMERICAN CONFLICT OF LAWS: AN UNDEVELOPED 
AREA
Habitual residence as a connecting factor is an area yet to be developed in 
American conflict of laws.  First, the concept of habitual residence has received 
barely any attention in American conflict of law literature.  In major conflict of law 
textbooks and commentaries, habitual residence is mentioned at most as a “subject 
of frequent use in international matters and international conventions.”270 In many 
law journals, habitual residence becomes a topic of discussion only when the 
Hague Convention is involved, and the discussions are almost always constrained 
to the provisions of relevant convention as well as the convention cases in U.S.
courts. Even during the drafting of the third restatement of conflicts, a proposal to 
substitute habitual residence for domicile met strong resistance, and as a result the 
concept of domicile was reinstated in the draft of the new restatement.271
Second, the current Second Conflict of Law Restatement, which has a 
strong influence on the conflict of law rules nationwide, contains no provision on 
habitual residence.  Although the Second Restatement does mention “residence” or 
“legal residence,” the term as used in the Second Restatement is understood as “the 
equivalent of domicile.”272 In the Second Restatement, there is an illustration about 
“home,” but the illustration is mainly to help determine domicile.273 It has also 
been observed that as developed in modern usage in the U.S., the concept of home 
is “fairly close to the concept of domicile.”274
Third, the U.S. ratified the Child Abduction Convention in 1988.275 In the 
same year, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA) was adopted.  
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Under ICARA, an application of the concept of habitual residence in U.S. courts in 
the convention related cases is required.276 During the past decades, however, the 
acceptance of habitual residence remained primarily within the realm of the Hague 
conventions and there has been no case in which the U.S. Supreme Court takes a 
view on habitual residence as opposed to domicile.277 In short, the recognition and 
application of habitual residence in the U.S. is limited.
Nevertheless, the U.S. participation in the Hague conventions makes it 
possible, and also creates a real need, to accept the concept of habitual residence in 
the U.S.  In fact, the concept of habitual residence as used in the U.S. law can be 
seen as early as in the Refugee Act of 1980.278 In the context of the Refugee Act,
however, habitual residence was used mainly to help determine the refugee status, 
and applied only to a stateless person.279 Thus, for purposes of conflict of laws, the 
use of habitual residence as a connecting factor in the U.S. actually began with the 
ratification of the Child Abduction Convention.
Like in all other common law countries, domicile is a principal connecting 
factor of conflict of laws in the U.S., and it is viewed as “an enduring and persistent 
relationship” between a person and a place.280 As noted, under the Second 
Restatement, domicile in conflict of laws serves the functions of determining, 
among others, judicial jurisdiction and choice of law.281 In choice of law, for 
example, a general rule is that the law of a person’s domicile at death determines 
the distribution of movable property of the person.282 With regard to jurisdiction, 
domicile plays an indispensable role.  In divorce cases, for example, a stated rule is 
that “a state may not exercise judicial jurisdiction to grant a divorce if neither 
spouse is domiciled in the state.”283
But there has long existed a voice disfavoring the use of domicile in the U.S.
The critics have argued that the “domiciliary concept is used for too many diverse 
purposes.”284 The point of the concern has been that the “finding of domicile is too 
dependent upon subjective inferences drawn from the facts, even undisputed facts, for 
the meaning of that concept not to vary with its context.”285 For this reason, a question 
that was raised long ago is whether “domicile is a useful concept which assists proper 
analysis or is an albatross around our necks that we would be better to be quit of.”286
One suggestion has been that “we should find the concept of ‘habitual residence’ useful 
in domestic as well as international cases . . . .”287
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With the implementation of the Child Abduction Convention, the U.S. 
courts must deal with the determination of habitual residence. The convention 
cases often involve questions as to whether the child has been removed or retained 
from their habitual residence, and whether the parents requesting return have 
custody rights, which are determined by the law of habitual residence of the 
child.288 When making this determination, the U.S. courts are confronted with at 
least four major questions, and the answer to each of these questions reflects, at 
least from the judicial viewpoint, the current attitude towards habitual residence in 
the U.S.
The first question concerns the difference between habitual residence and 
domicile. As discussed, habitual residence is not commonly used in the U.S.  There 
is also a belief in the U.S. conflict of law literature that “habitual residence is quite 
a bit like domicile.”289 Behind the belief is a notion that “in most circumstances 
habitual residence has the same essential meaning that is usually associated with 
one’s home.”290 Under the Second Restatement, “a person’s domicil [sic] is 
usually the place where he has his home.”291 In this regard, the line between 
domicile and habitual residence seems blurred and appears to diminish the 
necessity of separating habitual residence from domicile. 
When hearing the Hague Convention cases, the U.S. courts have 
recognized that “[t]he concept of habitual residence must be distinguished from 
‘domicile.’”292 Courts have also realized that earlier decisions were wrong to have 
“equated the concept of habitual residence to that of domicile.”293 In Friedrich v. 
Friedrich, the Sixth Circuit  explicitly held that “habitual residence must not be 
confused with domicile.”294 In Kijowska v. Haines, a Polish citizen brought a suit 
in the federal district court in Chicago, seeking an order to have her daughter who 
lived with her father in Illinois, be returned to Poland.295 In applying the Hague 
Convention and its implementing federal statute, the Seventh Circuit was of the 
opinion that “equating habitual residence to domicile would re-raise the spectre 
[sic] of forum shopping by encouraging a parent to remove the child to a 
jurisdiction having a view of domicile more favorable to that parent’s case.”296 In 
Koch v. Koch, it was held by the Seventh Circuit that “‘habitual residence” should 
bear a uniform meaning, independent of any jurisdiction's notion of domicile.297
The second question is about the concept of habitual residence. Since no 
definition of habitual residence is offered in the Hague Convention, it would be up 
to the courts of particular jurisdiction to interpret the term.298 However, due to the 
lack of a body of case law developed in the U.S., the courts, while struggling to 
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define the concept,299 have followed a 1989 British case (In re Bates) where it was 
held that for the purpose of habitual residence “there must be a degree of settled 
purpose” and “[a]ll that is necessary is that the purpose of living where one does 
has a sufficient degree of continuity to be properly described as settled.”300 Then, 
the “settled purpose” becomes, and continues to be, a “hallmark” of habitual 
residence determination in the U.S. courts.301
In a number of cases, the U.S. courts have attempted to define habitual 
residence, especially for the purpose of the Child Abduction Convention. As early 
as1993, the Sixth Circuit in Friedrich held that “habitual residence pertains to 
customary residence prior to the removal.”302 Under the Sixth Circuit’s opinion, 
when making a determination, the “court must look back in time, not forward.”303
In the 1995 case of Feder v. Evans-Feder, the Third Circuit ruled that the habitual 
residence of a child is “where he or she has been physically present for an amount 
of time sufficient for acclimatization . . . .”304 With a caution, however, the courts 
seem to have restrained themselves from developing “detailed and restrictive rules 
as to habitual residence,” for the concern of making it “as technical a term of art as 
common law domicile.”305
The third question that the U.S. courts have encountered is how to 
determine habitual residence.  Since the U.S. Supreme Court has taken no position 
on habitual residence, the determination of it in the U.S. courts is not subject to 
uniform authority.  Although there is a debate among the courts as to whether the 
determination should be treated as a question of “fact” or “mixed fact and law,”306
it is generally agreed that determination of habitual residence “is a fact-specific 
inquiry that should be made on a case-by-case basis.”307 In child abduction cases, 
many courts consider habitual residence of a child a fact-driven issue that requires 
a factor analysis.308 The factors to be considered include: the environment the child 
has acclimated to and their social life; the period of the child’s residing in a 
particular place; the age of the child and the child’s relationship with the family and 
friends; the place of the child’s schooling and medical care; and the language the 
child speaks.309
When analyzing the factors, the U.S. courts are often trying to find two 
important elements—the actual residence and the settled purpose.310 The U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, for the purpose of determining habitual 
residence in the U.S. for children from Hague Convention countries, issued a 
“Policy Memorandum” (PM) that sets forth the criteria intended to guide the 
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determination in November 2013.311 The PM criteria explicitly provide the tests of 
actual residence and intention.312 Under the PM criteria, the actual residence test 
looks for “compelling ties” to the U.S. “for a substantial period of time,” while the 
intent test focuses on the “entry for purposes other than adoption” at the time the 
child entered in the U.S.313
In Friedrich, the Sixth Circuit adopted certain rules to help determine 
habitual residence.  First, habitual residence shall not be made as technical a term 
of art as common law domicile, and its determination shall depend on “the facts 
and circumstances of each case.”314 Second, when determining the habitual 
residence of a child, the court must focus on the child, not the parents.  Third, the 
determination shall be based on the child’s “past experience,” but not on any future 
plans that the parents may have.  Fourth, “a person can have only one habitual 
residence” at any given time.  Fifth, habitual residence may be “altered” only “by a 
change in geography and the passage of time.”315 These rules are also taken as 
“guiding principles” for the determination of habitual residence.316
The fourth question is about ascertainment of intention.  As noted, one key 
factor in determining habitual residence is the “settled purpose.”  To identify such 
purpose, a very basic inquiry is whether there is intent to make a place the habitual 
residence.  In their adjudication of child abduction cases, the U.S. courts are quite 
divided on the finding of intention.  In Mozes v. Mozes, the Ninth Circuit 
concentrated on the parental intention and held that the determination of a child’s 
habitual residence in a place would depend on (a) a shared of intention of parents to 
abandon the former habitual residence and (b) a change in geography for an 
appreciated period of time.317
Other courts, however, believe that the parental intention shall be 
considered in light of the circumstances of the child.  In Gitter v. Gitter, the Second 
Circuit set forth a two-step standard.318 Under this standard, to determine a child’s 
habitual residence, the court shall first look into “the shared intent of those entitled 
to fix the child’s residence (usually the parents),” and then inquire whether “the 
child has acclimatized to the new location and thus has acquired a new habitual 
residence, notwithstanding any conflict with the parents’ latest shared intent.”319
Similarly, in Feder the Third Circuit held that the determination of any particular 
place as habitual residence “must focus on the child and consist[] of an analysis of 
child’s circumstances in that place and the parents’ present, shared intentions 
regarding their child’s presence there.”320
In the recent case of Martinez v. Cahue, the Seventh Circuit considered 
the determination of habitual residence as “a ‘mixed’ question of law and fact.”321
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It is the Seventh Circuit’s view that the inquiry into habitual residence is “a 
‘practical, flexible, factual’ one that ‘accounts for all available relevant evidence 
and considers the individual circumstances of each case.’”322 The court held that 
“[t]he two most important factors in the analysis are parental intent and the child’s 
acclimatization to the proposed home jurisdiction,”323 and that because “the 
intention or purpose which has to be taken into account is that of the person or 
persons entitled to fix the place of the child’s residence,”324 the “shared intent ‘has 
less salience when only one parent has the legal right’ to determine residence.”325
The Sixth Circuit took a totally different approach.  The court downplayed 
the parental intent inquiry and looked instead into the child’s past experience.  In 
Friedrich, the Sixth Circuit opined that “[t]o determine the habitual residence, the 
court must focus on the child, not the parents, and examine the past experience, not 
future intentions.”326 In Robert v. Tesson, the Sixth Circuit further held “that a 
child’s habitual residence is the place where he or she has been physically present 
for an amount of time sufficient for acclimatization and which has a degree of 
settled purpose from the child’s perspective.”327 Thus, according to the Sixth 
Circuit, for determination of the child’s habitual residence, the objective standard 
of the time and place where the child physically resides, rather than subjective 
intent, shall be employed.   
The diverse opinions in the U.S. courts with respect to the determination 
of habitual residence suggest the fact that habitual residence as a concept has 
received judicial recognition in the U.S. but its application remains multi-faceted.  
This phenomenon is expected to continue until the Supreme Court of the U.S. takes 
position on the issue of habitual residence, although the approach of combined 
parental intent and child’s circumstances is deemed to be the majority view.328
Nevertheless, the use of habitual residence in the judicial practice necessarily raises 
a question about what the American conflict of law community would need to do in 
order not to be left behind in this respect.
V.  HABITUAL RESIDENCE AND THE THIRD CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT: A
PROPOSAL
The last few decades have witnessed an international acceptance of 
habitual residence and a growing trend of application of habitual residence in 
conflict of laws. Although certain issues remain subject to further debates or 
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clarification, it is without question that habitual residence has in fact eclipsed, or to 
a certain extent has even replaced, domicile and it has become an important 
connecting factor and indispensable part of conflict of laws. The development of 
general acceptance of habitual residence should not be ignored during the drafting 
of the Third Conflict of Laws Restatement.  In addition, the judicial recognition of 
habitual residence in the U.S. provides the necessity, as well as the legal basis, to 
have habitual residence included in the new restatement.
Some may have a concern that since the rules on habitual residence have 
not quite been well-developed in the U.S., it might be premature to address them in 
the Third Restatement because the purpose of a restatement is to restate the legal 
rules that constitute the common law in a particular area, or to state what are 
believed to be the consensus of American courts on particular points of law.329 As 
a matter of fact, there is a sufficient ground to have habitual residence “restated.”  
First, habitual residence is a well-established rule in the international treaties that 
the U.S. has ratified.  Second, there are a sufficient number of cases in which U.S. 
courts have ruled on habitual residence.  Although the court rulings are almost all 
related to the treaties, the underlying doctrinal analysis has the significance of a 
general application.  Third, with the increase of the international use of habitual 
residence, it is reasonable to predict that more attention will be called to the use of 
habitual residence in the area of conflict of laws in the U.S. both academically and 
practically.
The following is a proposed set of habitual residence rules for 
consideration.  The proposal is based on the foregoing discussion and contains the 
general practice in the international community and the majority view held by the 
U.S. courts.  The proposal intends to suggest that habitual residence be formally 
adopted in the Third Restatement as a conflict-of-law connecting factor.  There are 
two options under the proposal. One option is to replace domicile with habitual 
residence. An alternative option is to take habitual residence in conjunction with 
domicile and to apply it in the case where the uncertainty of a domicile appears.          
Rules of Habitual Residence
1. Habitual Residence in General
The habitual residence of a person is a place to which the rules of conflict 
of laws accord significance in the specified legal areas because of the person’s 
connection with that place.330
2.  Definition of Habitual Residence
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person is a place that possesses significance in conflict of laws and is supplemental to the person’s 
domicile.  If the domicile of a person cannot be ascertained, or is difficult to ascertain, the habitual 
residence of such person will be used instead.
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(1) The habitual residence of a natural person is the place where the person has 
settled to live for an appreciable period of time and which under all 
circumstances has become the center of that person’s life.331
(2) The habitual residence of a legal person is the place where the central 
administration, or nerve center, of the legal person is located. 
(3) If a legal person operates a branch, agency, or any other establishment, the 
place where the branch, agency, or any other establishment is located shall 
be treated as the place of habitual residence of such branch, agency, or 
establishment. 
3. Determination of Habitual Residence
(1) The determination of habitual residence is regarded mainly as a question of 
fact subject to consideration of all the circumstances.
(2) The law of forum governs the determination of habitual residence.
4. Change of Habitual Residence
(1) A natural person may change their habitual residence by living in a new 
place for an appreciable period of time with a settled purpose to make it the 
center of their life. 
(2) Once the new habitual residence is acquired, the prior habitual residence is 
abandoned. 
5. Continuity of Habitual Residence
(1) For purposes of conflict of laws, a person can have only one habitual 
residence at a given time.
(2) An existing habitual residence of a person is presumed to continue unless 
a new habitual residence has been acquired. 
6. Habitual Residence of Minors
(1) The habitual residence of a minor generally follows that of the parent or 
parents.
(2) The habitual residence of a minor who does not live with any parent is, in 
general, that of a person or persons who have the parental responsibility 
for the minor and with whom the minor lives.
(3) The determination of the habitual residence of a minor shall be made by 
reference to the circumstances of the minor with a consideration of the 
parental intention pertaining to the minor’s residence.    
(4) The primary focus of the determination of a minor’s habitual residence is 
on the social and family environment in which the minor lives, or the 
degree of the settled purpose from the minor’s perspective.332
                                                                                                                                
331 The factual test of habitual residence of a person should focus on the continuity of the 
connection between a person and the place of the person’s residence. Factors to consider include family 
status and ties; duration and continuity of stay; employment; exercise of a non-remunerated activity; 
intention of the person; location of the school of children; source of income and location of income tax 
payments; as well as the intention of the person. 
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Several points are worth mentioning.  First, habitual residence as a 
connecting factor may be provided as a rule of general application or the rule that 
applies to specific area.  As a general rule, habitual residence would replace 
domicile and become a primary connecting factor.  If applied in specific areas, 
habitual residence could be used as a supplement to domicile or as a gap-filler 
when the domicile can hardly be determined or ascertained.  Alternatively, habitual 
residence and domicile could co-exist and be applied to different issues.  For 
example, when personal status is involved, habitual residence mainly applies, while 
in some other cases (e.g., dispute concerning corporate internal affairs), domicile 
may control. 
Second, determination of habitual residence is a matter of fact analysis. 
For the habitual residence of a natural person, the focal point is on the 
circumstantial factors, including actual presence, length of living, purpose of 
residing, center of activities, axis of family relations, and continuity of stay, 
regardless of future intention.  A person may have more than one residence but 
only one habitual residence in light of conflict of laws.  A husband and a wife may 
each have their own habitual residence if they are legally separated.  For a legal 
person, the habitual residence will be the place of its headquarters, or its principal 
place of business if the place of headquarters could not be ascertained.
Third, the habitual residence of a minor normally is the place of habitual 
residence of the minor’s parents.  If the parents are divorced, the minor’s habitual 
residence will depend on which parent the minor actually lives with on the regular 
basis.  The right of custody will be the key element for the determination.  In case 
of joint custody, the place where the minor’s best interest will be served and 
maintained will take the priority.  Again, all considerations given are factually 
based and its determination will not rely on the intention of parent(s) but on the 
actual residence and regular activities of the minor.
Fourth, the habitual residence of a person, natural or legal, is to be 
determined according to the law of forum (lex fori).  Since the determination of 
habitual residence is factually based, the forum applies its own rules of habitual 
residence for the purpose of both jurisdiction and choice of law.  Application of 
forum law would also help minimize the possible conflict between the forum law 
and foreign law because the rules of habitual residence and the interpretation of 
such rules differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  The foreign rules of habitual 
residence may be applied in certain cases where the validity of habitual residence is 
a preliminary question pertaining to the merits of the claim.  Once the habitual 
residence of a person is ascertained, the status and its legal attributes of such person 
will be determined by the law of the place of the person’s habitual residence.
                                                                                                                                
332 Factors relevant to judge the social and family environment of a child include “[(1)] a change in 
geography combined with the passage of an appreciable period of time[; (2)] age of the child[; (3)] 
immigration status of child and parent[; (4)] academic activities[; (5)] social engagements[; (6)] 
participation in sports programs and excursions[; (7)] meaningful connections with the people and 
places in the child’s new country[; (8)] language proficiency[; and (9)] location of personal belongings.” 
GARBOLINO, supra note 288, at 67–68 (footnotes omitted).   
2018] HABITUAL RESIDENCE V. DOMICILE 197
VI.  CONCLUSION
Habitual residence has now become an internationally accepted conflict of 
laws connecting factor, and the trend to have it to replace, or act as an alternative 
to, domicile in many legal areas continues to grow.  The fact that habitual residence 
as a connecting factor is well received in the global community implies the 
significance and importance of its application in conflict of laws.  There is no doubt 
that with respect to all three subjects of conflict of laws, namely, jurisdiction, 
choice of law, and enforcement of foreign judgment, the role that habitual 
residence is playing, and will continue to play, will not only be quite meaningful 
but also indispensable.
With the international acceptance of habitual residence, American conflict 
of laws is facing a challenge.  The drafting of the Third Restatement provides a 
great opportunity to reconsider American conflict of laws. Although the very focus 
of the Restatement is on American Law, the international common practice should 
not be ignored because the increasing integration of the world economy requires 
each country look more externally for harmonization. Thus, it would be unwise for 
any country to be separated from the rest of the world, and the U.S. is no exception.
The First Restatement of Conflict of Laws represented traditional 
American conflict of laws. The Second Restatement substantially altered the First 
Restatement as an outcome of the revolution of conflict of laws in America. The 
first two restatements, however, did not pay much attention to the international 
conflict of laws rules and practices. The world is now more different than ever 
before. Hopefully, the Third Restatement will echo the changes in conflict of laws 
both domestically and internationally, and fairly position American conflict of laws 
to meet the needs in the globalized world. Among the changes and needs, of 
course, is the adoption of habitual residence.

